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Nowhere does human nature appear less lovable than in 
the relations of whole nations to each other. . . . The will 
to subjugate another, or encroach upon what belongs to 
him, is always present.1 
 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of 
person.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the Cold War, “ordinary deaths from 
starvation and preventable diseases” amount to approximately 250 
million people, most of them children.3  Global poverty refuses to 
decline, as global inequality continues to increase, more than 
doubling since 1960.4  Thomas Pogge argues that wealthy states 
have a responsibility to help those in severe poverty.5  This 
 
       †   This paper was presented originally at a “Pogge and His Critics” 
conference at the University of Newcastle.  My sincere thanks to Peter Jones, 
Thomas Pogge, John Tasioulas, and Leif Wenar for comments on earlier drafts. 
      ††  Lecturer of Political Thought, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon 
Tyne, United Kingdom, t.brooks@newcastle.ac.uk. 
 1. IMMANUEL KANT, ON THE OLD SAW: THAT MAY BE RIGHT IN THEORY BUT IT 
WON’T WORK IN PRACTICE 312 (John R. Silber ed., E. B. Ashton trans., 1974). 
 2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 3, U.N. 
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 3. THOMAS W. POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COSMOPOLITAN 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS 98 (2002). 
 4. Id. at 99–100. 
 5. Id. at 22–23, 25. 
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responsibility arises from the foreseeable and avoidable harm the 
current global institutional order perpetrates on poor states.6  
Pogge demands that wealthy states eradicate global poverty, not 
merely because they have the resources, but because they share 
responsibility for its continuation.7  Thus, for Pogge, global poverty 
is more than a wrong imposed on the poor: it is a violation of 
human rights and a crime. 
In this paper, I aim to demonstrate that Pogge’s conclusions 
do not follow from his argument.  More specifically, if affluent 
states have a negative duty to assist those in severe poverty, their 
duty is not absolute because they are not fully responsible for this 
poverty.  Moreover, if global poverty is one of the greatest crimes 
against humanity, then it seems inappropriate at best to support 
proposals, pace Pogge, which leave the guilty parties walking free.  
We should punish states that cause global poverty. 
II. THE THRESHOLD CONDITION8 
Human rights enjoy a particular status amongst more general 
rights.  States often disagree about what should serve as rights.  
Human rights are those rights commonly ascribed to citizens by 
most states.  Many of these have since become incorporated into 
international legal documents.  For example, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights marks out specific rights such as “the 
right to life, liberty, and security of person.”9  These particular 
rights enjoy a special status, given their endorsement by most states 
across the globe.10 
The importance of human rights rests, in part, not only on 
their broad acceptance in international and domestic law, but 
rather on their ability to enable the enjoyment of a minimally 
satisfactory life.  That is, following the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, all persons have “the right to life,” no matter their 
place of residence. 11  This view does not commit us to the position 
 
 6. See id. at 201. 
 7. See id. at 201–03. 
 8. Pogge does not employ the term “the threshold condition,” although it is 
clearly supported by his work, as I will demonstrate in this section. 
 9. UDHR, supra note 2, art. 3. 
 10. See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 
1993). 
 11. See UDHR, supra note 2, art. 3. 
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that all people must enjoy the same life, but that everyone has the 
right to enjoy a certain standard of living, meeting or exceeding a 
certain threshold of bare existence.  Let us call the right to a life 
above this bare minimum the threshold condition.  If others prevent us 
from meeting or surpassing this threshold, then they both deny the 
enjoyment of our basic needs and their act constitutes a human 
rights violation.  The threshold condition, then, stipulates that a 
person suffers a violation of her human rights if she is prevented 
from the enjoyment of a basic good.  We violate human rights and 
deny basic needs when we fail to meet the threshold condition.12 
Thomas Pogge lists several basic needs that require the special 
standing of human rights.  He says “other, more elementary basic 
goods are . . . physical integrity, subsistence supplies (of food and 
drink, clothing, shelter, and basic health care), freedom of 
movement and action, as well as basic education, and economic 
participation.”13 
This list is not meant to be exhaustive.14  But we need not 
attempt to spell out all basic needs.  Instead, let us agree with 
Pogge that any conception of basic needs satisfying the threshold 
condition will include “the right to life, liberty, and security of 
person” as found in Article III of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.15  Thus, when the enjoyment of basic needs meets 
the threshold condition, we can agree with Pogge that social 
institutions which ensure “secure access . . . to minimally adequate 
shares of all basic goods . . . are, according to my proposed core 
criterion of basic justice, fully just.”16 
When the threshold condition is not met, we are denied access 
to our most basic needs and our human right to these needs is 
violated.  The violation of human rights is not something we do to 
ourselves, but something others do to us.  Specifically, we suffer a 
harm in having our rights violated.  If we choose to fast and deny 
ourselves access to food, our human rights are secure insofar as 
 
 12. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 38.  Pogge notes that the threshold condition 
is not static: “These thresholds will vary for different human rights and for 
different sources of threats to one human right . . . . These differentiations have to 
be incorporated into the specification of human rights.”  Id. at 48. 
 13. Id. at 49.  See THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 33 (1989). 
 14. Pogge notes that other goods serve as basic needs, such as “liberty of 
conscience” and “political participation” amongst many others.  See POGGE, supra 
note 3, at 48–49. 
 15. UDHR, supra note 2. 
 16. Id. at 38. 
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food is available to satisfy our basic needs.  We may deny 
nourishment to the point of causing physical harm to our bodies.  
The only variety of harms that count as human rights violations, 
however, are those harms inflicted on us by others that deny us the 
satisfaction of our basic needs. 
When others deny us access to basic needs, such as food, they 
violate our human rights by virtue of the harm they impose upon 
us.17  One form this violation can take is an institutionally engendered 
crime.18  Such a view is best understood by an institutional approach.  
The institutional approach highlights the way our institutions 
contribute to the occurrence of harm.19  It does not deny that other 
factors may contribute to harm or human rights violations.20  Nor 
does this view deny responsibility to those who harm others for 
their wrongdoing.  Instead, Pogge argues that we should judge our 
institutions based on how well they protect our basic needs and 
human rights.21   
Institutions do not warrant our support if they avoidably 
engender foreseeable deprivations of our basic needs.  The 
institutional approach helps narrow our attention on the problem 
of human rights violations in a new way, namely, “[w]e are asked to 
be concerned about avoidably unfulfilled human rights not simply 
insofar as they exist at all, but only insofar as they are produced by 
coercive social institutions in whose imposition we are involved.”22 
Human rights violations occur on an individual level—i.e., 
only individuals can suffer human rights violations—but it is 
important not to lose sight of the role institutions may play in 
engendering human rights violations and increasing their 
likelihood.  The utility of the institutional approach is found in its 
ability to highlight the ways in which institutional factors impact on 
the denial of human rights to individuals.  Indeed, Pogge offers a 
compelling case that our global institutional order does engender 
harm.  He readily reminds us of any number of alarming statistics 
concerning the size and scale of severe global poverty.23  Our global 
 
 17. See generally id. at 47–49 (discussing the violation of basic human rights). 
 18. See id. at 199. 
 19. See id. at 49. 
 20. See id. at 199–204. 
 21. See Thomas W. Pogge, Liberalism and Global Justice: Hoffmann and Nardin on 
Morality in International Affairs, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 67, 70 (1986). 
 22. POGGE, supra note 3, at 172; Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and 
Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48, 52 (1992). 
 23. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 2. 
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institutional order is thought to not only constitute a structure that 
allows for severe poverty, but has also given rise to increasing 
political and economic inequalities between affluent and poor 
countries.24 
More importantly, our global institutional order does not 
merely allow for such deprivation and inequality: it engenders severe 
poverty and inequality.  Pogge provides countless examples.  One 
source is international economic bodies, such as the World Trade 
Organization, which have enabled the exacerbation of deaths from 
global poverty through monetary agreements that favour affluent 
states at the cost of poor states.25  A second source is protectionist 
exemptions insisted upon by affluent states, which have “had a 
huge impact on employment, incomes, economic growth, and tax 
revenues in the developing world where many live on the brink of 
starvation.”26  A third source concerns what Pogge aptly identifies as 
the international resource privilege whereby Third World dictators sell 
large swathes of national resources and incur foreboding debts, 
enriching themselves at the great expense of the welfare of their 
people.27  Potential coup leaders vie for control through civil war in 
order to take advantage of this privilege.28  We would remove a 
major incentive for political and economic instability within 
countries suffering from severe poverty if we denied the 
international resource privilege.29  In these ways, the global 
institutional order contributes to global poverty.   
Nowhere does Pogge deny that other factors also contribute to 
the existence of global poverty, nor is he committed to the view 
that the global institutional order is the primary or solitary cause.30  
 
 24. See id. at 199–201. 
 25. See id. at 18–19. 
 26. Id. at 18. 
 27. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 113–14, 142–43; Thomas W. Pogge, “Assisting” 
the Global Poor, in THE ETHICS OF ASSISTANCE 260, 270–72 (Deen K. Chatterjee ed., 
2004); Thomas W. Pogge, Recognized and Violated by International Law: The Human 
Right of the Global Poor, 18 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L LAW 717, 737–40 (2005); see also PETER 
SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION 105 (2d ed. 2004). 
 28. POGGE, supra note 3, at 113–14, 142–43; Pogge, “Assisting” the Global Poor, 
supra note 27, at 270–71; Pogge, Recognized and Violated by International Law, supra 
note 27, at 738–39. 
 29. POGGE, supra note 3, 142–43, 154–55, 162–67; Pogge, Recognized and 
Violated by International Law, supra note 27, at 739–40. 
 30. See Alison M. Jaggar, “Saving Amina”: Global Justice for Women and 
Intercultural Dialogue, in REAL WORLD JUSTICE 37, 47–49 (Andreas Follesdal & 
Thomas Pogge eds., 2005). 
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He recognizes that several other factors may well play a role, too.31  
Pogge is only committed to the view that the global institutional 
order is one contributing factor in the creation and maintenance of 
global poverty.32 
Global poverty is a deprivation of basic needs to people 
without their consent; global poverty is a human rights violation.33  
Affluent states bear responsibility for this state of affairs.34  Pogge’s 
concern is not merely that affluent states support a global 
institutional order that engenders poverty.  On the contrary, his 
concern is that these states bear responsibility for an order that 
harms poor states in a way that is foreseeable and avoidable.35  That 
is, states are responsible to the degree they cooperate in a global 
institutional order that engenders human rights deprivations on 
the global poor.36  Pogge nowhere claims that the global 
institutional order is the sole or primary cause of global poverty, 
admitting that other factors have relevance as well.  It then follows 
that, while the global institutional order’s responsibility for global 
poverty may be high, it is not absolute: it does not possess full 
responsibility for global poverty because it is not the only relevant 
causal or moral factor for global poverty.37 
Affluent Western states, thus, share responsibility for global 
poverty: they do not own complete responsibility.38  For example, 
affluent states share their responsibility with corrupt politicians in 
the Third World.39  Pogge offers us a useful example: 
Faulting institutional factors for a high murder rate need 
not at all exonerate the criminals, nor is denouncing all 
murders and murderers tantamount to condoning laxity 
 
 31. Thomas W. Pogge, An Egalitarian Law of Peoples, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 195, 
213–14 (1994). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See, e.g., Pogge, Recognized and Violated by International Law, supra note 27, 
at 717–45; Jaggar, supra note 30, at 45, 47–50. 
 34. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 115 (stating that the international borrowing 
privilege helps rulers maintain power and results in countries saddled with debt); 
see also id. at 142 (stating that we as citizens of rich countries are implicated by 
authorizing our firms to acquire resources from tyrants); see also supra note 29 and 
accompanying text. 
 35. See Thomas W. Pogge, Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties, 19.1 
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 55, 60 (2005); POGGE, supra note 3, at 198. 
 36. See Pogge, “Assisting” the Global Poor, supra note 27, at 279. 
 37. See Pogge, supra note 31, at 213–14 (stating that poverty creates 
corruption); POGGE, supra note 3, at 199, 201–04. 
 38. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 115. 
 39. See id. at 22. 
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of gun control . . . . Even though each and every murderer 
is fully accountable for his act, the citizens in a democracy 
may also bear an additional collective responsibility for 
some fraction of all homicides if these are attributable to 
the lack of adequate handgun legislation, for example, or 
to an unjust distribution of police protection.40 
Perhaps affluent states are primarily responsible for global 
poverty through the global institutional order they impose on poor 
states after all.  Furthermore, perhaps this order makes it more 
likely that corrupt Third World leaders will plunder their own 
state’s resources to the detriment of their citizens.  The injustice of 
the global order may take the lion’s share of the responsibility for 
the problem, but this responsibility must be shared with those who 
contributed to this injustice. 
III.  THE GLOBAL HARM PRINCIPLE 
If affluent states share responsibility for causing harm to the 
global poor, does this warrant any duties of assistance from them?  
For Pogge, each of us has a negative duty to refrain from causing 
unwarranted harm to others.41  This duty contrasts with a positive 
duty: the duty to benefit others or prevent harm.42  Pogge nowhere 
denies the importance of positive duty, but instead he limits his 
focus to negative duty.43 
When we harm others, we become liable to rectify the damage 
we have caused.  Mill’s harm principle says “[t]hat the only purpose 
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient 
warrant.”44  The harm principle holds that we have a negative duty 
to refrain from causing harm to others.  When “the security of 
others” comes under threat, the harm principle demands that we 
compel those who harm others to refrain from their behaviour.45  
Preventative measures to end wrongful harm become necessary.  In 
addition, Mill argues that when someone “has infringed the rules 
 
 40. POGGE, supra note 13, at 31. 
 41. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 130. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See Ser-Min Shei, World Poverty and Moral Responsibility, in REAL WORLD 
JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 139, 141–43. 
 44. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett 
Publishing Co. 1978) (1859). 
 45. Id. at 10. 
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necessary for the protection of his fellow [citizens],” such persons 
deserve punishment.46  If we harm others, then others can justify 
preventative measures to redress our wrongdoing.  My duty is to 
avoid harm to others.  But if I am responsible for harming others, I 
am under an obligation to correct the damage I have caused.  
Another way of stating this point is to say that I do not have an 
obligation to aid others unless I am responsible for their harm.47 
Mill’s harm principle is addressed to individuals and is meant 
to inform their relation to one another.48  Yet, Pogge’s project is 
addressed to members of affluent states with the goal of informing 
them of how they are responsible for harming the global poor.49  
We might argue that Pogge, in fact, endorses what we can identify 
as the global analogue of the harm principle, that is, a global harm 
principle.  The global harm principle states the following: 
(a)    Our state has a negative duty to refrain from causing 
harm to other states. 
(b)   If our state causes harm to other states, then these 
states can justify preventive measures to address the 
wrongdoing our state caused them.50 
States have a duty to avoid harming other states.  But if our 
state bears responsibility for harming other states, then we have an 
obligation to correct the damage we have caused.  That is, we have 
a negative duty of assistance to those we harm in virtue of our 
responsibility for their harm.  We have a negative duty to assist, 
justified by our violating the global harm principle.  This duty does 
not exist simply because others live in severe poverty.  We must 
bear responsibility for severe poverty in order to ground our 
obligation to assist those we have harmed. 
Affluent states share responsibility for global poverty.  In 
imposing coercive global institutional orders, affluent states 
engender “associated deaths and deprivations” among the global 
 
 46. See id. at 77. 
 47. We might characterize this position along the lines of Lon Fuller’s 
“morality of duty.”  LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 6 (rev. ed. 1969).  “It 
speaks in terms of ‘thou shalt not’ . . . . It does not condemn men for failing to 
embrace opportunities for the fullest realization of their powers.  Instead, it 
condemns them for failing to respect the basic requirements of social living.”  Id.  
My thanks to Richard Mullender for this suggestion. 
 48. See MILL, supra note 44, at 9. 
 49. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 129–30. 
 50. See id. at 130–34. 
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poor.51  The problem is not simply that the global poor suffer severe 
deprivation, but rather that they suffer because of the coercive 
global institutional order.52  Pogge says “[w]e, the affluent countries 
and their citizens, continue to impose a global economic order 
under which millions avoidably die each year from poverty-related 
causes . . . . We must regard our imposition of the present global 
order as a grave injustice . . . .”53  Affluent states are responsible for 
a coercive global institutional order that engenders the foreseeable 
and avoidable harm of severe poverty.  Therefore, affluent states 
violate the global harm principle that forbids harm to other states.  
As a result, affluent states have a negative duty to assist the global 
poor to rectify the harm that they have caused them. 
If we have a negative duty to assist those we have harmed, then 
our next concern is determining the full extent of the assistance we 
owe the global poor.  The idea that we can be justifiably penalized 
for wrongdoing is not unlike the thought that the guilty deserve 
punishment.  In fact, Pogge makes several references to global 
poverty as a “crime.”54  For Pogge, severe poverty is “the largest, 
(though not the gravest) crime against humanity ever 
committed.”55  Severe poverty is a crime: it is a violation of human 
rights as a deprivation of basic needs.  Moreover, it is not mere bad 
luck, but rather is engendered by a coercive global institutional 
order supported by affluent states to the detriment of the global 
poor.  Affluent states share responsibility for the harm the global 
institutional order helps foster.  Their responsibility manifests as a 
negative duty to assist the global poor to correct the harm caused 
them.  This responsibility is not unlike the duty of a criminal to 
“pay back” the community for his crime, an idea central to the 
classical understanding of retributivist punishment.56 
There is no distinct crime that best captures the variety or scale 
of severe poverty perhaps beyond a “crime against humanity.”  
 
 51. See Pogge, “Assisting” the Global Poor, supra note 27, at 279. 
 52. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 176; Pogge, supra note 22, at 56–57. 
 53. POGGE, supra note 3, at 109. 
 54. Id. at 24–26. 
 55. Thomas Pogge, The First UN Millenium Development Goal: A Cause for 
Celebration?, in REAL WORLD JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 317, 334.  See Pogge, 
“Assisting” the Global Poor, supra note 27, at 277; Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty 
and Human Rights, 19.1 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 2 (2005). 
 56. See John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238, 238–46 
(1979); THOM BROOKS, PUNISHMENT (forthcoming 2008); Thom Brooks, On 
Retributivism, http://ssrn.com/abstract=857364. 
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Severe poverty contains more harms than simply decreasing life 
expectancy and causing deaths.57  Moreover, it affects nearly half 
the world’s population.58  Global poverty is more than murder, it is 
a crime unto itself.  Pogge adopts the view of punishment as 
compensation: we must “compensate the global poor” in virtue of 
the harm we have caused them.59  First, we must end the harm we 
have perpetuated.  Pogge recommends we restructure the global 
order so that we no longer engender harming the global poor.60  
Thus, we must avoid continuing to abrogate the global harm 
principle.  Second, our compensation must seek to correct the 
harm we have generated.61 
But there are issues that arise in connection with these 
suggestions.  The first problem is that Pogge’s recommendations 
are unsatisfactory because they require more from us than our 
negative duties commit us to providing the global poor.  The 
second problem is that Pogge’s recommendations are 
unsatisfactory because they let those who today engender severe 
poverty walk free tomorrow without sanction. 
Negative duties are tied to the harm we are responsible for 
bringing about.  The greater our responsibility for our 
wrongdoings, the greater our obligation to rectify the damage we 
have caused.  Negative duties to assistance only commit us to 
eradicating global poverty if we bear full responsibility for it.  Yet we 
have seen that, while Pogge offers a convincing account that 
affluent states share responsibility for engendering global poverty, 
he clearly recognizes that other factors contribute to the existence 
of severe poverty.62  Affluent states do not own complete 
responsibility for the full reality of global poverty.63 
The lack of complete responsibility is a major problem for 
several reasons.  The first reason is that Pogge mistakenly believes 
his argument for a negative duty to assist commits him to the view 
that we have an obligation to eradicate global poverty.  For 
example, he argues that “[e]ach member of society, according to 
 
 57. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 199–201. 
 58. See Pogge, “Assisting” the Global Poor, supra note 27, at 265. 
 59. See id. at 278; POGGE, supra note 3, at 140; Debra Satz, What Do We Owe the 
Global Poor?, 19 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 48–50 (2005) (arguing that experts disagree on 
the best measures for economic justice). 
 60. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 9. 
 61. Id.; see also Pogge, “Assisting” the Global Poor, supra note 27, at 278. 
 62. POGGE, supra note 3, at 115–16. 
 63. Id.; see also Pogge, “Assisting” the Global Poor, supra note 27, at 268. 
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his or her means, is to help bring about and sustain a social and 
economic order within which all have secure access to basic 
necessities.”64  He is well known for his proposal that if affluent 
states gave just one percent of their aggregate global income, then 
world poverty would be eradicated—and so we should end world 
poverty.65 
While ridding the world of global poverty may be morally 
required on any number of grounds, Pogge’s arguments pertaining 
to negative duties of assistance do not support such a move.  If 
affluent states share responsibility for the harm of global poverty, 
then surely their duties to assist extend no further than the degree 
of responsibility they possess.  Affluent states are not wholly 
responsible for the engendering of global poverty and, thus, they 
are not wholly responsible for eradicating global poverty.  They 
lack a negative duty to eradicate global poverty.  Of course, this still 
leaves open a justificatory strategy for arguing that positive duties of 
assistance may make up the remainder.  But negative duties to assist 
cannot support global poverty eradication as the argument stands. 
This matter is related to a second problem.  We owe 
compensation as a form of punishment for our causing harm to 
others.  Our punishment should be proportional to our crime; our 
compensation should be proportional to our responsibility.  Pogge 
demonstrates that we share responsibility for harm.66  He does not 
demonstrate any reliable method for determining how responsible 
we are for harm.  Of course, any compensation scheme cannot 
aspire to perfect precision in addressing wrongdoing.67  But Pogge 
faces a real problem in determining our share of compensation.  
He says “[t]o be sure, it is next to impossible to quantify the 
compensation efforts we owe for contributing to and (especially) 
profiting from the injustice of the global institutional order.”68  In 
fact, Pogge admits that we are unable to calculate anyone’s 
responsibility “even with all the care and information in the 
 
 64. POGGE, supra note 3, at 69. 
 65. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 2, 205; Jaggar, supra note 30, at 50–51; Pogge, 
“Assisting” the Global Poor, supra note 27, at 279–80. 
 66. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 115. 
 67. See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 245–46 (Allen 
W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991); POGGE, supra note 
13, at 152 n.54; THOM BROOKS, HEGEL’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: A SYSTEMATIC 
READING OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (forthcoming 2007). 
 68. Pogge, supra note 35, at 74. 
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world.”69  If we are unable to discern even a rough guess 
concerning the full extent of our responsibility, then we can say no 
more than that we should be a party to a compensatory scheme.  
We cannot commit ourselves to a view of how much we owe until 
we have a view of how responsible we, in our state, are for the harm 
we cause. 
Now let us consider, too, Pogge’s well known Global Resources 
Dividend proposal.70  He argues that “those who make more 
extensive use of our planet’s resources should compensate those 
who, involuntarily, use very little.”71  My worry is that while the 
victims of the crime of global poverty may benefit from such a 
scheme, those states responsible for the deaths of several million 
people from poverty-related causes may walk free and escape 
sanction altogether.  Those states most responsible for severe 
poverty are not required to compensate the global poor at all, but 
only if and when they use natural resources.  If Pogge’s proposals 
were realized, it would be satisfactory for states that violated the 
global harm principle to rapidly embrace alternative, renewable 
energy resources which would allow these states to avoid making 
any contribution to this compensatory scheme.  The Global 
Resources Dividend is presented as one means by which the 
damage caused by affluent states might be addressed, and yet it 
allows affluent states to continue to deny existence to the global 
poor, or at least those that the affluent states are responsible for 
harming.  If violation of the global harm principle entails a 
negative duty to assist those harmed, the Global Resources 
Dividend is a proposal that allows states the opportunity to avoid 
honouring their duties to assist the global poor. 
 
 69. Id. at 80. 
 70. See POGGE, supra note 13, at 256 n.18, 264–65; POGGE, supra note 3, at 196–
215; Pogge, supra note 31, at 199–205.  For a critique, see Lisa L. Fuller, Poverty 
Relief, Global Institutions, and the Problem of Compliance, 2 J. MORAL PHIL. 285, 285–97 
(2005); Tim Hayward, Thomas Pogge’s Global Resources Dividend: A Critique and an 
Alternative, 2 J. MORAL PHIL. 317, 317–32 (2005); Mathias Risse, How Does the Global 
Order Harm the Poor?, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 349, 371–75 (2005).  The Global 
Resources Dividend is not Pogge’s only recommendation for eradicating global 
poverty.  Pogge also makes a case for a Democracy Panel operated by the United 
Nations and financed by a Democracy Fund.  See POGGE, supra note 3, at 156–66.  
For an alternative argument for “remedial responsibilities,” see David Miller, 
Distributing Responsibilities, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 453, 453–71 (2001); and, for its criticism, 
see Thom Brooks, Cosmopolitanism and Distributing Responsibilities, 5 CRITICAL REV. 
INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 92, 92–97 (2002). 
 71. POGGE, supra note 3, at 204. 
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The existence of global poverty is claimed to be perhaps the 
most extensive violation of human rights in our bloodied history.  
Severe poverty is highlighted as perhaps the worst and most 
extensive crime of all time.72  Yet, it remains a crime that lacks any 
punishment for those who bear responsibility for its many evils.  
The justice of the Global Resources Dividend is restricted to its 
ability to help those least able to help themselves.  Its justice does 
not extend to an adequate measure for states that engage in 
perpetuating global poverty because it only seeks to help victims 
without any sanction of offenders nor compensation from them for 
their wrongdoing.  Thus, if negative duties require us to 
compensate our victims on account of our wrongdoings, then our 
negative duty of assistance is a duty of wrongdoers to compensate 
their victims.  It is possible that outlaw states may either refuse to 
participate in Pogge’s scheme or seek renewable energy sources in 
an effort to avoid compensating others for past wrongs, not 
primarily to decrease environmental degradation.  Negative duties 
create an obligation on states whenever they cause harm.  The 
Global Resources Dividend is not a scheme that penalizes those 
who harm, but a measure that grants a general amnesty to states 
most worthy of compensating victims. 
There is something important to be said in favour of 
prioritizing the welfare of victims over the punishment of their 
perpetrators.  Our victims suffer severe deprivations in need of 
rectification.  The Global Resources Dividend is meant to satisfy the 
basic needs of the global poor.  Any list of basic needs, however, 
will include rights to life and liberty, but also the right that justice 
be done and be seen done.  Victims of severe poverty may 
understandably first desire physical integrity.  But bound up in this 
right is that those who interfere in the physical integrity of the 
global poor must not only refrain from such behaviour, but they 
must be held to account for their behaviour.  The Global Resources 
Dividend perpetuates injustice for the global poor by failing to 
provide for the punishment of those who harm the poor. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Global poverty is a crime like no other, both more extensive in 
the forms of deprivations it can take and in the numbers of people 
 
 72. See Pogge, “Assisting” the Global Poor, supra note 27, at 277; Pogge, supra 
note 55, at 2. 
1. BROOKS - RC.DOC 3/7/2007  12:37:47 PM 
532 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:2 
affected.  Pogge provides a powerful account of how affluent states 
have a negative duty of assistance to the global poor.  The global 
poor are harmed by a coercive global institutional order.  This 
order is maintained and supported by affluent states.  These states 
have a share of responsibility for the plight of the global poor on 
account of the support affluent states extend to this global order, 
and the foreseeable and avoidable harm this order imposes on the 
global poor. 
Pogge takes this argument to entail a negative duty to eradicate 
global poverty.  On the contrary, I have argued his account only 
justifies assistance, but not eradication.  The affluent states are not 
fully responsible for global poverty and, thus, only owe a degree of 
assistance equal to the harm caused.  Affluent states have a negative 
duty to assist, but not to end global poverty, although this view 
might be supplanted by arguments in favour of positive duties to 
assist that lead to a more complete argument entailing eradication 
of global poverty.  Pogge, however, does not offer such a picture. 
Moreover, not only is Pogge not actually committed to poverty 
eradication from his arguments, but neither is he committed to the 
Global Resources Dividend for an additional reason.  The Global 
Resources Dividend may end poverty, but it allows for the guilty to 
walk free.  If global poverty is the world’s greatest crime, then those 
who create the harms that have contributed to the modern crisis of 
global poverty are not held liable for any reparations for past 
misdeeds.  Victims of injustice may well first prefer enjoyment of 
basic needs, but one such need is arguably the right to see justice 
done.  Unless we punish states for causing harm to the global poor, 
justice is not fully implemented.  Pogge’s recommendations then 
do not follow from his arguments, nor do they satisfy a basic 
demand of justice. 
 
